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As demonstrated by Byrd, if the federal practice has a strong federal
or constitutional basis, it is likely to prevail. 9
In summary, it would seem that Hanna is indicative of the
Court's respect for the federal rules which it promulgated. For
example, in the strict Hanna situation the federal rule prevails, and
in the "outcome-determinative" class of cases there is no disrespect
to the Federal Rules because there is no conflict. The balance test
is also illustrative of the Court's respect for a uniform system of
federal procedure. If the federal practice is not applied in a par-
ticular situation, it is only because the practice is not as essential
to the maintenance of uniformity in federal procedure as the state
rule is to the policy of intrastate uniformity in result.
JAMES L. NELSON
Federal Jurisdiction-Labor Law-Jurisdiction to Remove Suits to
Enjoin Strikes to Federal Court
In American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int'l.
Union Operating Eng'rs1 the defendant union had ceased work,
and the plaintiff, there being a no-strike clause in their contract,
sought to enjoin the strike by a suit in the Pennsylvania state court.
The defendant removed to federal court under section 1441 (b) of
the Judicial Code.2 Plaintiff moved to remand under section 1447(c)
of the Judicial Code.- The district court denied the motion,4 holding
that it had jurisdiction under section 301 (a) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947r and that the case was, therefore, prop-
" Smith, supra note 16.
'338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985 (1965),
reversing 224 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
S(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original juris-
diction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be
removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and
served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1958).
"If at any time before final judgement it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall
remand the case . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
'224 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
[Vol. 44
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erly removable under section 1441(b). The district court then
denied a motion for temporary injunction," relying on section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act7 and Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson.' The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court,9
ruling that the federal courts had no jurisdiction and that, therefore,
the case should have been remanded to the Pennsylvania court.
The court based its decision on four basic issues of law: (1) whether
the wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and Sinclair preclude
federal jurisdiction in this area; (2) whether a decision that the
case is removable would lead to an absurd or unjust conclusion by
removing plaintiff's right to get an injunction; (3) whether there
is "federal question" jurisdiction in the first place; and (4) whether
a state court would have the power to grant an injunction if the case
were to be remanded.
The first point the court made was that section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act ° and the Sinclair decision do not simply reject the
right of the federal courts to give injunctions to stop strikes, but
instead eliminate the entire jurisdiction of federal courts in these
cases." In other words, does the phrase, "no court . . .shall have
jurisdiction to issue ... injunctions,"' 2 take away the entire power
of the court to hear the case, or does it merely remove "equity
jurisdiction"?" The court here said that the statute leaves the
federal courts powerless to take any jurisdiction in these cases.' 4
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
:224 F. Supp. at 989.
747 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
8370 U.S. 195 (1962).
o 338 F.2d 857.
10 No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment;
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).11338 F.2d at 840-42.
1247 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
"The problem of the misuse of the word "jurisdiction" to mean power to
give equitable remedies has been frequently discussed by legal scholars.
See, e.g., CHAFEE, SOME PROBLE S OF EQUITY 296-380 (1950); McCLIN-
TOCK, EQUITY, § 40 (2d ed. 1948).
14 338 F.2d at 840.
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There has been a split of authority on this issue. A majority of
cases' " have agreed with the decision in American Dredging, but
a substantial minority16 and many renowned scholars17 have taken
the opposite view. However, all of these cases on both sides were
either before the Sinclair decision or were decisions of district
courts and, thus, cannot be relied on as authoritative precedent.
The court in American Dredging partly relied on Sinclair. In
Sinclair the issue was whether section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act' s impliedly overruled section 4 of Norris-La-
Guardia." The Court, by a five-to-three decision, held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was in no way overruled and that the Court
would make no accommodation between the two statutes. The
Court stated, "The District Court was correct in dismissing count
3 of petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act."2 The court of appeals relied on this as authority
that the Supreme Court thought that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
totally removed jurisdiction.2'
It must be pointed out, however, that at no time in Sinclair
nor in any other decision, so far as this writer's research discloses,
has the Court discussed the issue of how "jurisdiction" is used in
section 104. Also, the Court has made statements in other cases
which would seem to indicate that the words mean equity juris-
diction only.22
"Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Starr, 219 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955);
Merchants Refrigerator Co. v. Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D.
Cal. 1963); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153
(E.D.N.Y. 1961); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F.
Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959); Hat Corp. of America v. United Hatters, 114
F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1953).
" Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Dist. Council No. 11, 229
F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers
Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); Crestwood Dairy Inc. v.
Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); H. A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting
& Portable Eng'rs Union, 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Pocohontas
Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council 93 F. Supp.
217 (D. Maine 1950).
, See, e.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements-Some
Unanswered Questions, 63 COLUm. L. Rnv. 1027 (1965); CHAFEE, SOME
PROBLEMIS OF EQUITY 367-74 (1950). See also Comment, Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes, 32 TENN. L. REV. 284 (1965).18 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
10 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
10 370 U.S. at 215.
21338 F.2d at 840.
"E.g., "The Norris-LaGuardia Act-considered as a whole and in its
various parts-was intended drastically to curtail the equity jurisdiction of
[Vol. 44
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In addition to the above, the Third Circuit relied on the use of
the word "jurisdiction" in section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Actf
and upon the fact that the Supreme Court had defined jurisdiction
just six years before the passage of the act as: "power to entertain
the suit, consider the merits and render a binding decision there-
on. ... )24 The court then assumed that Congress knew of this
definition when it passed the act, and the court relied on section 2
to show it did use it in this manner." This assumption by the court
seems falacious, for in section 7 of the act2" the term "jurisdiction"'
is again used. It seems clear from a careful reading of section 7
that Congress only intended the term to mean equity jurisdiction.
Moreover, the use of the word in section 7 shows that the act only
intended to limit the power of the courts to grant the equitable
remedy of injunction because in section 7 Congress is clearly not
trying to define the jurisdiction of the court, but only supplying
the conditions under which the equitable remedy of injunction may
be given.
The second holding of the court of appeals is based upon the
principle that courts should not interpret statutes to lead to absurd
or unjust conclusions. The court concluded that an absurd and
unjust conclusion is reached by a decision that the court had re-
moval jurisdiction because the court would then be depriving the
plaintiff of injunctive relief available in the state courts. Such a
conclusion would leave the federal court with a case under con-
federal courts in the field of labor disputes." Milk Drivers' Union v. Lake
Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 101 (1940). "[I]ts [the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's] prime purpose was to restrict the federal equity power."
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58
(1944).
"' In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction
and authority of the courts of the United States, as such jurisdiction
and authority are defined and limited in this chapter, the public policy
of the United States is hereby declared as follows:
.. . therefore, the following definitions of and limitations upon the
jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United States are enacted.
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
2' General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).
338 F.2d at 840-41.
2 No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a tempo-
rary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, as defined in this chapter, except after hearing the testi-
mony of the witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-exam-
ination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath,
and testimony in opposition thereto if offered, and except after findings
of fact by the court to the effect . . .
47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
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sideration for which it could not give a remedy. The court pointed
out that to have jurisdiction is to have not only the ability to hear
the case but also to provide a remedy for it."
The question whether a state is precluded by Norris-LaGuardia
from issuing an injunction has never been decided by the Supreme
Court.2" If the Third Circuit is correct in saying that the state
court does have this right, is it unjust to conclude that the federal
courts nevertheless have jurisdiction? When a case is removed
from a state court to a federal court certain rights are invariably
lost."0 Yet the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not dissolved
because of this loss of right. Why should this be a determinative
issue in the present case alone?
There is no doubt that the court was correct in stating that it
would be an absurd conclusion to say that federal courts had juris-
diction in this case but had no remedy available which could be
granted. But certainly there are adequate remedies other than in-
junction against the strike which the federal courts could grant.
The district court held that it could not grant an injunction but
could give money damages, for the complaint had asked for any
other appropriate relief.30 The district court also noted that even
if the complaint did not make this request, the court could still grant
other appropriate relief under rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 1 The Third Circuit held this rule inapplicable
since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not to be used to
expand jurisdiction.32 The court of appeals also asserted that the
only way money damages would be useful to gain jurisdiction in
this case is by use of section 1441 (c) of the Judicial Code,'3 if
damages were a separate controversy within the meaning of the act.
'The court held that this would not be a separate controversy and
-2 338 F.2d at 843.
" This writer's research discloses no Supreme Court case dealing with
this issue.
" E.g., if plaintiff filed a bill in equity in North Carolina, and defendant
then removed the case to federal court, plaintiff's right to a jury trial in
North Carolina would be lost in federal court. N.C. CoNsT. art. 4, § 1;
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-172 (1943); Worthy v. Shields 90 N.C. 192 (1884);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-Op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 538 (1958).
" 224 F. Supp. at 988.
"1FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
2 "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED.
R. Civ. P. 82."28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1958).
[Vol. 44
NOTES AND COMMENTS
thus section 1441 (c) could not be used in this case." Both of these
assertions of the Third Circuit are correct, except that the court
misconstrued what the district court held. The district court did not
hold that other relief could be given in this case so that it could
gain jurisdiction under section 1441(c), nor did it use rule 54(c)
to expand jurisdiction. What the district court actually held was
that it could give money damages with or without the use of the
procedural rule 54(c) and, therefore, the "absurd conclusion" of
having jurisdiction without a remedy does not exist. In fact the
district court had another and perhaps more effective remedy which
it could use. The contract between plaintiff and defendant in this
case provided for compulsory arbitration of grievances." The
court could, therefore, grant an injunction forcing arbitration.36
The third basis for the court's holding was that, assuming that
Norris-LaGuardia only restricts the power to issue an injunction
and not the jurisdiction of the court, the federal courts still do not
have jurisdiction over the case because there was no diversity of
parties and no federal question and therefore the case did not come
within the constitutional bounds of federal jurisdiction 7
The question of what is a federal question has plagued the
federal judiciary from shortly after the framing of the Constitution
until the present day. s There is no rule or definition which ade-
quately covers this question. Nevertheless, some guidelines have
been established.3 9 The Third Circuit determined in American
"338 F.2d at 849. Although it is not entirely clear, distinct causes of
action apparently are required for there to be separate controversies. Amer-
ican Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
3 See Brief for Appellant p. 2, Brief for Appellee p. 7.
It was conclusively decided in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act meant that federal courts could give specific performance to arbitration
agreements: "It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that
industrial peace can be best obtained in that way." Id., at 455. If arbi-
tration were enforced, could the strike be stayed pending the arbitration?
This question is unanswered by the Court as far as this writer's research
can determine.
" U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
"8E.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Shulthis v.
McDougal 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes 96
U.S. 199 (1878); Osborn v. Bank of United States 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
824 (1824).
"0E.g., the federal question must be on the face of the complaint; the
ultimate substantive issue must be of federal law; and the right created by
federal law must be a substantive element of the case. Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). See for good discussions of federal
1965]
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Dredging that the plaintiff may, in drawing his complaint, base it
on the law he wishes.40 If he casts it in such a way that the decision
must be based on a construction of the Constitution, a federal statute,
or a treaty, or in some other way based on federal law, then and
only then has a federal question been raised. The Third Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff in this case based his complaint solely on
state law and in no way did the plaintiff base his case on section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act or on any other federal law.
This conclusion seems highly dubious, for in no way does it take
into account the decisions subsequent to the passage of section 301
which have vastly affected the whole field of suits arising out of
labor contracts. The cases, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,4 Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney,' and Local 174,
Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,43 basically have decided
the questions of which forum labor contract cases may be tried in and
what law is to be applied.
From these cases it is clearly shown that the court was amiss
in concluding that the suit on the issue of breach of a labor con-
tract's no-strike provision is not a question of federal law, no
matter how the complaint in the case was framed. For these three
cases show that labor contract cases, which are clearly the cases
covered by section 301(a), are to be determined by federal law
alone. Even though they may be tried in a state court, they still
must be tried on federal law. To carry this one step further, since
question jurisdiction, 1 BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 25 (Wright ed. 1960); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § .60 (2d
ed. 1964).
40 338 F.2d at 846, citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
41353 U.S. 448 (1957). This case said:
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in
suits under § 301 (a)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply
in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws. ... Any state law applied,
however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent
source of private rights.
Id. at 456-57.
1 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Here it was decided that § 301 (a) did not
give federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction, but jurisdiction is instead
concurrent with the state courts.
"-369 U.S. 95 (1962). In this, the last decision of what is commonly
called the trilogy, the Court held that "incompatible doctrines of local law
must give way to principles of federal labor law. . . . The dimensions of
§ 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law
must be paramount in the area covered by the statute," and "we cannot
but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." Id. at 102-05.
[Vol. 44
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all labor contract cases must be tried on a federal standard, there
is necessarily always a federal question and, therefore, always
federal jurisdiction.
The last of the contentions of the court is in actuality an at-
tempt to rebut the dissenting opinion. Judge Hastie in his dissent44
contended that the state courts have no power to enjoin strikes,
and therefore, plaintiff was not unjustly deprived of his right to
an injunction as the majority contended. Judge Hastie reached
this conclusion by reasoning that the Sinclair decision brought
prohibition of injunctions in section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia into
the federal common law called for by the Lincoln Mills decision.
The majority opinion unfortunately never discusses the question
of whether this prohibition has become part of the federal common
labor law. Instead it goes to great lengths to show that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was not originally intended to affect state proceed-
ings. This is probably true, but in no way answers Judge Hastie's
contention.
In the final analysis only the Supreme Court will be able to say
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be extended to the states
by way of Lincoln Mills.4" The Court may limit itself purely to a
construction of the statute." On the other hand, the balancing of
public policies may force the Court to make the prohibition part
of the federal common labor law as Judge Hastie contended. If
the Court decides to extend this anti-injunction by dictating which
remedies state courts may give, it will cause much friction between
our federal and state court systems. But, if the Court allows the
state courts to enjoin strikes, this will cause a preference for the
state forum to such an extent that it is very doubtful that the federal
court will be used at all for these cases. Thus the decision of Amer-
ican Dredging, the lack of removal jurisdiction and that states' re-
"338 F.2d at 857-58.
'Although the Supreme Court has never discussed the question of
whether state courts may enjoin strikes, state courts generally have said
that they could grant the injunctions. E.g., McCarroll v. Los Angeles
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); and other cases collected at 32 A.L.R.2d
822 (1953). Legal scholars have generally opposed this view. E.g., Aaron,
Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements-Some Unanswered Questions,
63 CoLum. L. REv. 1027, 1029-40. (1965).
" If the question is limited to statutory construction, the Supreme Court
will probably construe the words "court of the United States" as limiting
only federal courts. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
19651
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tention of the power to enjoin strikes, circumvented the policy ex-
pressed by Congress in section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act.
The problems discussed in this case are fundamental to the
litigation of labor disputes in the courts. It would appear to this
writer that if and when the Supreme Court or Congress answers
these questions, the answers should reach the conclusions opposite
those of the court of appeals. This must be done if for no other
reason than a consistent public policy.
The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills47 and Lucas Flour8 de-
cided that labor contract suits are to be decided by federal common
law. Yet if suits on breach of no-strike provisions are not allowed
in federal courts, the irony is created of state courts creating fed-
eral common labor law in this area. This, of course, would put the
tremendous, time-consuming responsibility of review of this state-
created federal common law squarely on the shoulders of the Su-
preme Court.
The perplexing problems discussed in American Dredging can
be solved finally only by a Supreme Court decision unless, of course,
Congress legislates an answer. Since even a temporary injunction
is likely to break a strike before any appeal can be processed through
the courts, it seems unlikely that the question presented by a state
injunction of a strike will ever reach the Court before becoming
moot. Moreover, the question of whether the federal courts have
removal jurisdiction over such a case can obviously be reached
by the Court only through the federal system. Consequently, it is
difficult to imagine why the Supreme Court, faced with both of
these questions in this case, did not grant certiorari. It is clear that
the answers are paramount in litigation of breaches of no-strike
clauses in labor contracts. Therefore, they demand the attention
of the Court in the immediate future.
DENNIS JAY WINNER
"353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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